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Negative emotionality is associated with an increased risk for developing the metabolic 
syndrome (MetS). Presumably, negative emotionality partly confers such risk via alterations in 
peripheral autonomic and neuroendocrine effector pathways that promote metabolic 
pathophysiology. Conversely, protection against risk for the MetS may be conferred by an 
individual’s tendency to use cognitive strategies to regulate negative emotions. However, the 
brain systems by which cognitive emotion regulation relates to the MetS are unknown. 
Accordingly, we examined whether prefrontal and cingulate brain systems that jointly support 
cognitive emotion regulation and control peripheral physiological responses to negative 
emotional states represent a pathway linking emotion regulation to the MetS. Middle-aged adults 
(N=139; 74 men; mean age, 40.39 ± 6.2 years) underwent an fMRI scan while performing a 
Stroop color-word task that requires cognitive control, evokes a negative emotional state, and 
engages prefrontal and cingulate brain areas. Individual differences in self-reported tendencies to 
use cognitive reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy were assessed by the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The presence of the MetS was determined using the criteria of 
the National Cholesterol Education Program, Adult Treatment Panel III. After adjusting for age 
and sex, frequent cognitive reappraisal usage was associated with reduced likelihood of having 
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the MetS and with meeting fewer MetS criteria. Moreover, fMRI psychophysiological 
interaction analyses revealed that increasing task-evoked functional connectivity between the 
dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was associated 
with frequent cognitive reappraisal usage, reduced presence of the MetS, and meeting less MetS 
criteria, net the influence of age and sex. In an exploratory mediation analysis, this positive 
dACC-DLPFC connectivity mediated the association between cognitive reappraisal and the 
MetS. Individuals who frequently use cognitive reappraisal may be at lesser MetS risk in part via 
an enhanced capacity to recruit prefrontal cognitive control systems during negative affective 
states. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF THE METABOLIC 
SYNDROME 
The metabolic syndrome (MetS) refers to a premorbid clustering of cardiometabolic risk factors 
within an individual. These risk factors include central obesity, glucose intolerance, atherogenic 
dyslipidemia, hypertriglyceridemia, and elevated blood pressure. The MetS is clinically 
important because it confers risk for type II diabetes, endpoints of cerebrovascular disease (e.g., 
hemorrhagic and ischemic strokes), atherosclerotic coronary heart disease (CHD), and premature 
cardiovascular mortality among otherwise healthy individuals – above-and-beyond the risk 
conferred by its individual components alone (Bataille et al., 2006; Boden-Albala et al., 2008; 
Galassi, Reynolds, & He, 2006; Gami et al., 2007; Lakka et al., 2002; Li et al., 2008; Sattar et al., 
2003). Further, the MetS and its components are becoming increasingly prevalent, with recent 
epidemiological estimates indicating that about one-third of the U.S. adult population meets 
formal criteria for having the MetS (Ervin, 2009; Ford, Giles, & Dietz, 2002). This increasing 
prevalence has been associated with a commensurate rise in the prevalence of obesity, type II 
diabetes, and insulin resistance (a precursor to type II diabetes; Zimmet, Alberti, & Shaw, 2001). 
Yet despite epidemiological associations between the MetS, obesity, type II diabetes, and 
insulin resistance, it is important to note that these conditions do not have a one-to-one 
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relationship with each another (Mendez, Goldberg, & McCabe, 2010). For instance, obese and 
overweight individuals do not always present with insulin resistance, and normal weight 
individuals can exhibit insulin resistance (Abbasi, Brown, Lamendola, McLaughlin, & Reaven, 
2002; Ruderman, Chisholm, Pi-Sunyer, & Schneider, 1998). Moreover, the presence of the MetS 
does not necessarily correspond to an insulin resistant state for a given individual (Cheal et al., 
2004; Liao et al., 2004; Salazar et al., 2011; Sierra-Johnson et al., 2006). Such complex 
interrelationships underscore the importance of considering the MetS as a multifaceted and 
complex pathophysiological condition (Mendez et al., 2010). In addition, it is important to 
appreciate existing evidence that the clustering (or aggregation) of the metabolic and 
cardiovascular risk factors that comprise the MetS occurs more often than by chance alone 
(Alberti et al., 2009). Such nonrandom clustering raises the possibility that common or shared 
pathogenic mechanisms or processes may relate to the development of the MetS or elevate risk 
for MetS component clustering (e.g., Muldoon et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2010). Hence, there 
is a need to further delineate the complex and potentially common pathophysiological processes 
that influence MetS risk and, consequently, unfavorable endpoints of its related chronic diseases. 
It is important to note here, however, that efforts to characterize MetS risk factors and 
their correlates are further complicated by the lack of evidence-based guidelines for treating 
individuals meeting MetS criteria. As noted above, this complication stems in part from the fact 
that no specific or single pathophysiological process (or set of processes) has been identified to 
account for the clustering of syndrome components. For that reason, MetS prevention and 
treatment efforts are based largely on pharmacological approaches to affect individual MetS 
components, which introduces the possibility of adverse drug-drug interactions and related 
adverse events that are preferably avoidable. Such approaches also introduce concerns over 
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adherence, given the complicated drug regimens engendered by treating multiple cardiovascular 
disease risk factors through polypharmacy. By contrast, behavioral and lifestyle interventions, 
such as programs to change physical activity levels and dietary habits, may be more preferable 
than pharmacological approaches –insofar as such interventions may help reduce the prevalence 
and incidence (i.e., new cases) of the MetS at the population level without the costs and 
consequences typically associated with pharmacological approaches (Mendez et al., 2010). 
However, attempts to employ behavioral and lifestyle interventions can prove to be problematic 
because of their time-consuming nature and because of the demands they place on individuals for 
achieving long-term compliance (Butryn, Webb, & Wadden, 2011). 
In view of the above, there remains a need to improve the efficacy of existing MetS risk 
prediction, stratification, prevention, and intervention approaches. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that pairing adjunctive psychological interventions that focus on changing so-called cognitive 
appraisal strategies (described below) of the individual with behavioral interventions (i.e., those 
aimed at achieving weight loss through exercise and dietary changes) appears to be efficacious in 
remediating adverse metabolic and cardiovascular risk profiles—while also promoting the 
maintenance of lifestyle changes—as compared with dietary and physical exercise interventions 
followed in isolation (Shaw, O’Rourke, Del Mar, & Kenardy, 2005). This suggests that the study 
of cognitive appraisal processes in association with MetS risk may benefit from further 
investigation for two reasons. The first reason is based on the apparently beneficial effects of 
adjunctive psychological interventions on cardiovascular disease risk reduction. The second is 
based on the need to better understand the biological and behavioral correlates of the MetS so 
that potentially common etiological factors relating to the clustering of cardiometabolic risk 
factors may be identified and targeted for prevention and intervention (Hjemdahl, 2002). 
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1.2 STRESS- AND AFFECT-RELATED CORRELATES OF THE METABOLIC 
SYNDROME: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR EMOTION REGULATION 
As stated previously, the MetS presents with a complex pathophysiology whose etiology is not 
well understood (Grundy, Brewer, Cleeman, Smith, & Lenfant, 2004; Miranda, DeFronzo, 
Califf, & Guyton, 2005). Various factors have been considered to account for the shared variance 
or clustering among MetS components, such as a proinflammatory state (Eckel, Grundy, & 
Zimmet, 2005; Gustafson, Hammarstedt, Andersson, & Smith, 2007; Marsland, McCaffery, 
Muldoon, & Manuck, 2010). Empirically, however, no single factor appears to account (entirely 
or exclusively) for the clustering of syndrome components (Mendez et al., 2010). Further, 
genome-wide association (GWA) studies have yet to clearly identify genetic factors that 
commonly account for the pathogenesis and joint expression of syndrome components (Joy, 
Lahiry, Pollex, & Hegele, 2008; Lusis, Attie, & Reue, 2008). In fact, the genes that have been 
identified through GWA studies account for ~5-10% of the variance of the MetS phenotype 
(Lusis et al., 2008). Against this background, the relative contributions of behavioral and 
environmental factors in explaining the development of the MetS have become increasingly 
studied. One such factor widely studied in this regard is psychological distress (Tamashiro, 
2011), most often reflected by elevated or sustained levels of negative emotionality (or negative 
affect). 
 Indeed, psychological distress has been widely implicated in the etiology of the MetS and 
in the consequent elevation of CHD risk in particular (Brunner et al., 2002; Rozanski, 
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Blumenthal, & Kaplan, 1999; Vitaliano et al., 2002). In the main, prospective studies 
demonstrate that the incidence of the MetS and CHD is often preceded by prolonged periods of 
either mild and/or severe psychological distress, including general life stress, depressive and 
anxiety symptoms, and major depressive disorder (Chandola, Brunner, & Marmot, 2006; 
Goldbacher, Bromberger, & Matthews, 2009; Goldbacher & Matthews, 2007; Pyykkönen et al., 
2010). And interestingly, experimentally-induced depressive symptoms in primates seem to 
suggest that the induction of distress through social subordination appears to be followed by the 
development of MetS components, as well as coronary artery atherosclerosis (Shively, Laber-
Laird, & Anton, 1997). Additional apparent convergence between animal and human studies is 
found in studies showing that psychological distress is linked to functional disturbances in 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activity, autonomic nervous system activity, and lipid 
metabolism in the context of the development of the MetS or MetS-like models (Brunner et al., 
2002; Chrousos, 2000; Rosmond, 2005; Shively, Musselman, & Willard, 2009). In humans, for 
example, increased self-reported negative affect is associated with elevated fasting plasma 
glucose (Skaff et al., 2009), blood pressure (Kamarck et al., 1998), and circulating lipid and 
proinflammatory cytokine levels (Carroll et al., 2011; Steptoe, Hamer, & Chida, 2007; Wirtz, 
Ehlert, Bärtschi, Redwine, & von Känel, 2009). From these and other similar observations, it has 
been suggested that negative emotions and psychological factors, including depression, anxiety, 
and distress, may relate to risk for the MetS by impacting affect-related HPA axis functioning, 
autonomic activity, and possibly systemic inflammation. Hence, psychological distress may 
represent one of several possible etiological factors in the development of MetS risk. 
Addressing the possible links between psychological distress and the MetS has prompted 
animal and human research on individual differences in coping or other regulatory processes that 
 6 
might function to modulate negative affect. For instance, Roman Low Avoidance rats that 
exhibit apparent passive coping behaviors to behavioral stressors are more likely than control 
animals to develop insulin resistance and components of the MetS under comparable feeding 
conditions (Boersma, Scheurink, Wielinga, Steimer, & Benthem, 2009; Boersma, Benthem, van 
Dijk, & Scheurink, 2011; Boersma, Benthem, van Dijk, Steimer, & Scheurink, 2010). Work in 
humans has suggested that correlates of the MetS, such as elevated glycated hemoglobin 
(HbA1c), are more prevalent among individuals who report engaging in low levels of active 
coping strategies, such as problem-solving, and who report low levels of perceived control over 
stressful situations (Feldman & Steptoe, 2003). Further, passive coping styles that are 
characteristic of avoidance and perceived lack of control have also been associated with 
increased prevalence of hypertension in humans (Opie, 2004). More specifically, in terms of risk 
for the MetS, Yancura, Aldwin, Levenson, & Spiro (2006) found that emotionally negative, 
stressful experiences that are met with positive coping strategies covary inversely with the 
presence of the MetS. Hence, self-regulatory strategies that comprise positive coping styles may 
protect against meeting criteria for the MetS. Interestingly, in that study, neither negative nor 
positive affect per se related to the presence of MetS. In light of prior work highlighting the 
differential associations of various coping styles with physical health outcomes, Yancura et al. 
(2006) interpreted their findings to suggest that the affect modulation that results from emotion 
regulation could play a role in linking adaptive coping and the MetS. Thus, this kind of evidence 
suggests that the observed relation of psychological distress to the MetS in prior studies may 
relate in part to a reduced capacity to adaptively regulate negative emotional states, as opposed to 
the mere experiences of such states. 
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This particular view has been encompassed in recent theoretical models of emotional 
flexibility that suggest that individuals who are able to flexibly regulate their emotions exhibit 
more favorable physical health outcomes and reduced CHD risk (Kubzansky, Park, Peterson, 
Vokonas, & Sparrow, 2011; Kubzansky & Thurston, 2007; Rozanski & Kubzansky, 2005). In 
this regard, flexibility models expand upon the pathways that may link negative emotions or 
psychological distress and risk for MetS by incorporating the notion that the ineffective 
regulation of negative emotional experiences might also impact MetS pathophysiology and, 
consequently risk for CHD and other related outcomes. Hence, existing work and theoretical 
models would appear to suggest that individual differences in the ability to employ adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies to cope with negative emotional states and reduce psychological 
distress may increase vulnerability to physical illnesses, such as CHD, as conferred by the MetS. 
 
1.3 WHAT IS EMOTION REGULATION AND HOW MIGHT IT RELATE TO THE 
METABOLIC SYNDROME? 
The mechanisms linking emotion regulation to aspects of physical health, including MetS and 
CHD risk, can be viewed from a process model of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 
2007; Gross, 1998). According to this model, emotion regulation can be construed as the 
modifying of an emotional response through a set of automatic and control processes (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Gross, 1998). More precisely, these control processes are guided by goals that 
either focus on cognitive change or behavioral control. Moreover, this distinction of emotion 
regulation into cognitive change and behavioral control strategies has possible consequences for 
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physical health outcomes that are associated with sustained patterns of negative affect and 
autonomic physiology (Gross & John, 2003; Gross, 1998). Two control strategies that are 
relevant in this regard are cognitive reappraisal and behavioral suppression. 
Cognitive reappraisal is one of the most commonly studied emotion regulation strategies 
that reflect cognitive change processes. As such, cognitive reappraisal involves altering how a 
situation is interpreted in order to change the emotional meaning and ensuing experiential, 
expressive, and physiological responses associated with the emotion response (Gross, 1999; 
Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). This emphasis on changing how one thinks about the emotional 
relevance of a situation is consistent with appraisal theories of emotion and stress, which contend 
that appraisals are essential in generating emotional states and the concurrent physiological 
changes that accompany emotional responses (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1966). 
Moreover, because the generated emotional responses are dependent on the cognitive appraisal 
of the situation, it is likely that emotional responses should be amenable to change via cognitive 
reappraisal strategies. For this reason, cognitive reappraisal is generally conceptualized as an 
antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy whereby regulatory processes are typically 
employed prior to the onset of an emotional response (see Figure 1; Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Gross, 1998). Hence, in keeping with the temporal course of an emotion response, cognitive 
reappraisal strategies target the emotion appraisal period that occurs early in the emotion 
generation process. This reconstrual of an emotion-eliciting situation furthers the notion that 
employing cognitive reappraisal strategies during negative emotional experiences could attenuate 
the presumably adverse components of the multisystem emotion response (experience, 
expression, physiology) that often follows negative affect (Gross & John, 2003; Gross, 1998).  
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A large body of experimental studies provides support for the putatively adaptive 
function of cognitive reappraisal. In a recent meta-analysis, it was concluded that instructed use 
of reappraisal strategies consistently decreases the self-reported experience and behavioral 
expression of negative emotions (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Additional work has shown 
that the presumably salutary effects of instructed reappraisal are consistent with the results of 
studies that have examined the spontaneous use of emotion regulation strategies from an 
individual-difference standpoint. For instance, Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger (2006) 
reported that individuals who spontaneously use reappraisal strategies during a stressful public 
speaking task experienced less negative affect, showed less behavioral expression of anxiety, and 
demonstrated minimal arousal of autonomic physiology. More recent work from Memedovic, 
Grisham, Denson, & Moulds (2010) also suggested that individual differences in the trait-like 
use of reappraisal are associated with reduced self-reported anger and blood pressure reactivity 
following anger provocation, which might be linked to the beneficial effects that cognitive 
reappraisal might afford to individuals when they are faced with anger-inducing situations 
(Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011). Moreover, trait-like use of cognitive reappraisal is related 
to decreased negative affect, as well as a decreased cardiovascular and neuroendocrine 
responsiveness to psychological distress (e.g., Carlson, Dikecligil, Greenberg, & Mujica-Parodi, 
2012; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). Thus, it would appear plausible that reappraisal as a 
cognitive emotion regulation strategy might relate to MetS risk via buffering effects along 
psychological distress, autonomic, and neuroendocrine pathways (Brunner et al., 2002; 
Chrousos, 2000). 
In contrast to cognitive change and reappraisal strategies, behavioral control strategies, 
including expressive suppression, involve efforts to control or inhibit ongoing emotion-
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expressive behavior without affecting emotional experience (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Gross, 
2002). Since expressive suppression is defined as response-focused strategy, this emotion 
regulatory process is implemented after the various emotion response components have been 
initiated with the goal of impacting only the behaviors associated with emotional responses. 
However, an emphasis on down-regulating negative emotions through suppression may not be an 
adaptive emotion regulation strategy (John & Gross, 2004). For example, it has been suggested 
that suppressing outward signs of negative emotional experiences often results in increases in 
peripheral physiological activity (e.g., increases in sympathetic nervous system outflow), which 
over time if repeated often may relate to adverse cardiovascular and other health outcomes 
(Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997; Harris, 2001; Webb et al., 2012).  
Given the potentially divergent consequences of cognitive reappraisal and behavioral 
suppression on emotional responding, particularly physiological responding, it is possible that 
the tendency to differentially use these emotion regulation strategies could relate to physical 
health outcomes (John & Gross, 2004). In fact, psychophysiological studies of emotion 
regulation provide a basis to speculate whether typical use of cognitive reappraisal or 
suppression would be associated with differential risk (Gross, 1998). That is, the tendency to use 
cognitive reappraisal might relate to physiological changes that are ‘metabolically adaptive’, at 
least with respect to coping with a given psychological stressor or negative emotional situation 
(e.g., Mauss et al., 2007). Consistent with this hypothesis, Kinnunen, Kokkonen, Kaprio, & 
Pulkkinen (2005) reported prospective evidence that dispositional use of cognitive strategies to 
regulate negative emotions related to decreased risk for the development of the MetS. In contrast, 
it is conceivable that typical suppression use could relate to increased risk for MetS and 
associated components possibly via repeated increases in sympathetic cardiovascular outflow 
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during negative emotional situations. For instance, evidence suggests that the tendency to 
suppress emotion-expressive behavior during periods of increasingly high levels of negative 
affect predicts MetS factors, such as hypertension and incident CHD (Mauss & Gross, 2002). 
Greater use of suppression in everyday life has also been observed among women who are 
morbidly obese relative to healthy controls (Zijlstra et al., 2012). Moreover, among patients with 
coronary artery disease, intense negative emotions are associated with poorer physical 
functioning among individuals who made greater use of behavioral suppression (Karademas, 
Tsalikou, & Tallarou, 2011). These lines of evidence mirror recent prospective, longitudinal 
studies that consistently show that poor emotion regulation, self-regulation, and inhibitory 
control skills during early childhood determined the onset of weight problems in childhood and 
adolescence (e.g., Duckworth, Tsukayama, & Geier, 2010; Graziano, Calkins, & Keane, 2010). 
Together, these studies suggest that individual differences in cognitive (i.e., reappraisal) and/or 
behavioral (i.e., suppression) emotion regulation strategies may reflect trait-like characteristics 
that relate to MetS risk and its components. 
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Figure 1. The process model of emotion and emotion regulation 
The diagram outlines the steps involved in generating an emotion and how cognitive control processes can 
be implemented at each stage to regulate the emotion-generation process. How cognitive control processes 
interact with each emotion-processing step will differentially influence the multisystem emotion response 
(experience, behavior, physiology) and subsequent risk for MetS and CVD. 
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1.4 WHAT BRAIN AREAS MIGHT LINK COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL WITH THE 
METABOLIC SYNDROME? 
Although prior studies support the notion that cognitive and behavioral types of emotion 
regulation may be differentially associated with adverse cardiovascular outcomes, including 
obesity, hypertension, and the MetS, further work is needed to characterize the various processes 
by which emotion regulation is related to physical health (John & Gross, 2004). For example, 
autonomic and neuroendocrine responses during the regulation of negative affect have been 
proposed as mechanisms that may link cognitive emotion regulation strategies to the MetS 
(Kinnunen et al., 2005). However, it is possible that the autonomic differences that characterize 
cognitive reappraisal and suppression strategies may be secondary to functional changes in the 
central nervous system. Indeed, there is evidence that the cognitive and behavioral response 
processes involved in emotion regulation in addition to the associated autonomic measures of 
emotional responding are governed by partially overlapping brain systems. More precisely, 
prefrontal and cingulate brains regions that are networked with one another can regulate 
autonomic and neurohormonal outflow through circuitry with midbrain and brainstem areas that 
are more proximally involved in monitoring and controling peripheral physiology (Dampney, 
1994; Loewy, 1991; Neafsey, 1990). At the same time, these prefrontal and cingulate brains 
regions are involved in supporting higher cognitive control processes (e.g., working memory 
maintenance and manipulation, response inhibition, set-shifting, performance monitoring; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004) that are relevant to the cognitive control 
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of emotions as well as controlling emotional coping behaviors (Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Phillips, 
Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008). In this regard, prefrontal and cingulate systems are viewed as 
components of a neural network involved in the integration of autonomic, affective and cognitive 
control processes that facilitate both evaluative and effortful emotion regulation strategies, such 
as cognitive reappraisal and suppression (Critchley, 2009; Phillips et al., 2008). However, it 
remains to be determined whether these same prefrontal and cingulate brain systems that 
coordinate and integrate cognitive control processes with physiological activity to support 
emotion regulation link differential use of emotion regulation strategies (i.e., reappraisal, 
suppression) to the MetS. Hence, there is a need to elucidate the neurobiological substrates that 
could potentially link specific types of emotion regulation and cardiovascular health outcomes 
(DeSteno et al., in press). 
In support of this possibility, recent neural models of emotion regulation indicate that 
emotion regulation, particularly cognitive reappraisal, recruits executive cognitive control 
processes that are presumptively supported by regions of prefrontal (PFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortices (ACC; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 2000; 
MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ridderinkhof & van den 
Wildenberg, 2005). In the context of emotion, these cognitive control systems modulate limbic 
regions, including the amygdala and insula, which are implicated in emotional generative 
processes (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008). In particular, cognitive reappraisal is thought to 
involve the dynamic interaction between these cognitive control and appraisal systems to 
restructure, implement, and maintain alternative response tendencies to emotional events. 
Moreover, these cognitive control systems are also involved in autonomic, neuroendocrine, and 
cardiovascular regulation, particularly in the context of engaging in effortful cognitive processes 
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(Buchanan et al., 2010; Gianaros et al., 2005; Gianaros, Jennings, Sheu, Derbyshire, & 
Matthews, 2007; King et al., 2009; Urry et al., 2006), which is consistent with concurrent 
physiological patterns of activity that are associated with the use of different emotion regulation 
strategies. In light of these integrative functions in mediating cognitive reappraisal and 
physiological activity, we elaborate below on the functional roles of particular control systems in 
jointly (i) coordinating autonomic and neuroendocrine activity with adaptive behavior and (ii) 
orchestrating the selection, implementation, and monitoring of reappraisal processes and 
strategies. 
1.4.1 Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
Prior research suggests a role for medial PFC (mPFC) in appraisal processes and in the inhibitory 
control of emotional behavior that is coordinated with adaptive decision-making, specifically 
through affective self-reflection (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Ochsner et al., 
2004; Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2008). Consistent with this, animal studies have 
confirmed that mPFC is essential for inhibiting behavioral fear responses in view of the fact that 
stimulating mPFC neurons gates fear acquisition that is mediated through several amygdala 
nuclei (Quirk, Likhtik, Pelletier, & Paré, 2003). Similarly, neuropsychological patients with 
selective damage to the mPFC exhibit a lack of behavioral control during stressful events and 
deficits in regulating their emotions, perhaps indicating that a conscious, internal representation 
of one’s emotional state may be important for adaptive reappraisal of negative affect (Buchanan 
et al., 2010). Additional studies have shown a reliable, early recruitment of mPFC when 
reappraising negative emotions and down- regulating amygdala and insula activity (Etkin, Egner, 
& Kalisch, 2011; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004). This 
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involvement in modulating affective responses to stressful or otherwise emotionally-evocative 
experiences is consistent with mPFC circuitry—particularly its bidirectional connections with 
subcortical brain systems, including the amygdala and insula, and its connections with 
dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) regions that are critical in the effortful maintenance, manipulation, 
and interpretation of affective and cognitive stimuli and information in working memory 
(Carmichael & Price, 1995; McDonald, Mascagni, & Guo, 1996; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Price, 2005). Partly as a result of the inhibitory control that the mPFC can 
broadly exert over subcortical systems involved in fear conditioning, several subregions of the 
mPFC also exhibit a capacity to inhibit autonomic and HPA axis activity tied to psychological 
challenges and stressors (Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009). Indeed, mPFC lesion patients 
demonstrate increased heart rate responses to psychological stress, coupled with heightened 
negative affect and threat-perceptions (Buchanan et al., 2010; Critchley et al., 2003), which 
suggests the mPFC may be important for orchestrating physiological responses (i.e., dampened 
physiological arousal) that often appears to accompany cognitive reappraisal of negative affect 
(e.g., Mauss et al., 2007). Taken together, the mPFC is widely viewed as a neural substrate that 
helps coordinate appropriate autonomic responses during emotion generation and regulation 
(Silvers, Buhle, Ochsner, & Silvers, in press).    
1.4.2 Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
Studies using functional neuroimaging methods have related cognitive control processes, such as 
actively maintaining and manipulating information in working memory, to the DLPFC (Cohen et 
al., 1997). From a reappraisal perspective, this suggests a possible role for the DLPFC in 
manipulating the affective representation of emotional stimuli (Ochsner & Gross, 2005), while 
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ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) appears to be involved in the evaluation and selection of the 
emotional interpretation in accordance to reappraisal goals (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, 
Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). Together, areas of the lateral PFC might be jointly involved in 
initiating goal-relevant strategies that cognitively adjust an emotional response and in sustaining 
these cognitive strategies over the course of the emotional experience. Critically, however, 
because the DLPFC does not project directly to emotional appraisal systems, such as the 
amygdala, this crosstalk with the VLPFC and mPFC is thought to be important in the ‘top-down’ 
modulation of emotion response tendencies (Urry et al., 2006). 
1.4.3 Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
Areas within the dorsal ACC (dACC) are thought to support attention, executive control, and 
conflict and error monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004), as instantiated by reciprocal circuitry with 
the lateral PFC (BAs 9/46), motor and supplementary motor cortex (BAs 4/6), and parietal cortex 
(BA 7). At a broader level, this cortico-cortical circuitry with frontoparietal control regions 
positions the dACC to initiate and maintain cognitive control (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). 
Moreover, dACC areas support appraisal and regulation processes that are coordinated with 
physiological activity (Gianaros & Sheu, 2009; Gianaros et al., 2005). Consistent with this, it has 
been speculated that areas within the dACC calibrate and regulate the magnitude of autonomic 
reactions to self-relevant demands in order to support adaptive cognitive coping processes 
(Gianaros & Sheu, 2009; Gianaros et al., 2005; Gianaros, Onyewuenyi, Sheu, Christie, & 
Critchley, 2012). In fact, lesions to the dACC have been shown to alter cardiac responses when 
individuals are performing increasingly demanding cognitive tasks (Silvers et al., in press). 
Although there is evidence that both cognitive and affective coping processes recruit the dACC 
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in order to monitor ongoing conflict that involve overcoming incongruent, prepotent response 
tendencies (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, 
Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009), indicating a role of the dACC in integrating potentially distressing 
emotional and cognitive stimuli (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Bush et 
al., 2000). Similarly, in the context of cognitive reappraisal, dACC may function as a conflict 
monitoring system to ensure reappraisal success by monitoring for conflicts between initial 
emotion appraisals and subsequent cognitive reappraisals (Ochsner et al., 2002). 
1.5 GOALS AND HYPOTHESES OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The converging literature reviewed above show that the neural systems involved in emotion 
regulation—particularly cognitive reappraisal strategies—have been well defined across several 
cognitive neuroscience studies. More importantly, the functional properties of these prefrontal 
and cingulate cognitive control systems agree with neuropsychological studies demonstrating 
that reappraisal relies on higher cognitive control abilities, such as working memory capacity 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). In point, cognitive control capacity is of particular importance to 
reappraisal as it constrains the degree to which an individual may successfully reframe emotional 
events in a manner compatible with the regulatory end goal (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 
2008). Interestingly, individuals with the MetS show impairments in these supportive cognitive 
control abilities, including working memory and executive function, reappraisal strategies rely 
upon (Akbaraly et al., 2010; Bokura, Nagai, Oguro, Kobayashi, & Yamaguchi, 2010; Cavalieri et 
al., 2010; Kumari, Brunner, & Fuhrer, 2000; Yaffe, 2007). More importantly, these cognitive 
control impairments in the MetS have been shown to covary with microstructural damage in 
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prefrontal cortical areas (Segura et al., 2010; Yates, Sweat, Yau, Turchiano, & Convit, 2012) in 
addition to decreased activation in the mPFC during a 2-back verbal working memory (Hoth et 
al., 2011). As such, individual differences in neural activity in so-called cognitive control regions 
of the brain that support executive functions and by extension cognitive reappraisal, could 
plausibly covary with presence of the MetS. However, little is known about how these cognitive 
control neural systems differ between individuals with and without the MetS, particularly in the 
context of cognitive reappraisal. 
In view of the above, we thus reason that functional variation in the prefrontal and 
cingulate neural systems that support both cognitive control and peripheral physiology may link 
dispositional reappraisal and the MetS. Several studies provide initial evidence supporting this 
speculation. First, prospective and longitudinal studies have shown that individual differences in 
cognitive emotion regulation abilities predict the presence of MetS and associated syndrome 
components (Graziano et al., 2010; Kinnunen et al., 2005). Second, recent work has also shown 
that frequent cognitive reappraisal use in everyday life is related to increased dACC and DLPFC 
activity when inhibiting proponent responses to negative emotional material (Vanderhasselt, 
Baeken, Van Schuerbeek, Luypaert, & De Raedt, 2013). Moreover, self-reported use of cognitive 
reappraisal is associated with increased activation in frontoparietal cognitive control regions 
during the processing of negative emotional stimuli (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 
2009). Third, individuals with the MetS demonstrate decreased activity in similar frontoparietal 
brain areas during a verbal working memory task (Hoth et al., 2011). Moreover, these cognitive 
control prefrontal and cingulate regions are networked with midbrain and brainstem areas to 
regulate autonomic, neuroendocrine, and cardiovascular activity that is relevant to both emotion 
regulation processes and the pathophysiology of the MetS. Synthesizing these findings, the 
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present study proposes a first step towards identifying a specific neurobiological pathway that 
relates trait reappraisal to the MetS. Specifically, we attempt to test whether cognitive control 
neural systems show altered patterns of activation during a cognitive conflict task (i.e., Stroop 
color-word interference task) among individual with the MetS, and whether this functional 
variation in cognitive control neural systems represents a neurobiological pathway through 
which trait reappraisal covaries with the MetS. 
 Based on available literature, the following hypotheses were tested. First, we tested 
whether the tendency to use cognitive reappraisal in daily life is inversely related to the presence 
of the MetS, the number of MetS criteria met across individuals, and a derived continuous MetS 
score.1 Second, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test the hypothesis 
that the tendency to use cognitive reappraisal is related to increased activation within neural 
systems implicated in cognitive control. To this end, otherwise healthy middle-aged adults 
performed a modified version of the Stroop color-word interference task, which requires 
cognitive control, evokes a negative emotional state, and engages prefrontal and cingulate brain 
areas (Sheu, Jennings, & Gianaros, 2012). Next, we tested the third hypothesis that individuals 
with the MetS would exhibit decreased activation in the neural areas implicated in cognitive 
control noted above. Lastly, we tested whether differential neural response in the above cognitive 
control brain areas partly account (partially mediates) for cross-sectional associations between 
tendency to use cognitive reappraisal and the MetS. 
                                                 
1 The MetS was operationally defined as (i) the presence of the MetS; (ii) the number of syndrome criteria met; and (iii) a 
continuous MetS score (see Section 2.3 in Methods). Additional aims examining the relation of the MetS with emotion regulation 
and brain activity within cognitive control regions tested these three definitions of the MetS.  
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1.5.1 Exploratory Hypotheses 
Two additional hypotheses were tested. First, we tested whether the incongruent Stroop 
condition modulated the functional connectivity of the BOLD signal in the dACC and DLPFC 
network. And second, we examined whether these temporally coupled BOLD signal changes in 
the dACC and DLPFC covaried with self-reported reappraisal use and the MetS. These 
hypotheses were explored based on current understanding of the functional interactions and 
neuroanatomical connections between these two cortical brain regions in regulating cognitive 
control processes, including response inhibition, decision-making, performance monitoring, and 
initiating compensatory behavioral adjustments in order to select among competing cognitive 
responses (Sallet et al., 2011). Hence, these two regions within prefrontal and cingulate cortices 
that support various aspects of cognitive control are known to exert influence over each other 
based on context-specific situations. The dACC shows extensive connectivity to DLPFC as well 
as motor cortices, which furthers the dACC importance in implementing control processes for 
task goals, and coordinating motor behavior to accomplish these goals given its cortico-cortical 
connectivity with cogntive control and motor pathways (Paus, 2001). Meta-analyses of human 
functional neuroimaging studies further indicate that the ACC plays a key role in executive 
control (Bush et al., 2000), with emerging evidence demonstrating the functional coactivation 
between dACC and DLPFC during cognitive control tasks, such as the Stroop color-word task, 
that demand selective attention, performance monitoring, and interference resolution (Mohanty 
et al., 2007; Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) 
Several control models have proposed that the functional relationship of the dACC and 
DLPFC in implementing hierarchical levels of cognitive control can be understood from a 
conflict monitoring perspective (Botvinick et al., 2004). According to this conflict model of 
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cognitive control, dACC is thought to monitor performance, evaluate actions, and detect 
response conflicts within these performed actions. In the event of conflict, dACC signals the 
need for behavioral adaption by recruiting DLPFC regions that exert attentional control to 
maintain representations of goal-directed behavior as it pertains to a task. This hypothesis was 
recently supported by evidence indicating that increased conflict-related activity in the dACC 
during incongruent trials of the Stroop task predicted greater DLPFC activity in subsequent 
incongruent trials (Kerns et al., 2004). Moreover, dACC was negatively associated with reaction 
time (RT) during these subsequent incongruent trials while DLPFC was related to slower RT on 
post-error trials. In light of these results, it is possible that functional interactions between 
prefrontal and cingulate brain regions that monitor performance and mediate adjustments in 
cognitive control may assume a similar role among individuals who generally use cognitive 
reappraisal to reevaluate the affective salience of a negative situation (Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2008). That is, the need to reappraise a negative 
emotional event in unemotional terms requires (i) generating a strategy to minimize negative 
appraisals, (ii) maintaining the reappraisal goal in mind as well as the new appraisal, and (iii) 
monitoring changes in emotional state that might be due to interference from the enduring 
negative appraisals of the emotional event. These cognitive processes underlying reappraisal are 
presumably implemented by medial and lateral regions of prefrontal cortical regions, including 
the dACC and DLPFC (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2008). Support for this cognitive control 
network in possibly mediating effective cognitive reappraisal comes from several reports. First, 
dACC has been shown to track not only task performance, but changes in subjective frustration 
and negative affect that accompany demanding, cognitive control tasks, such as the Stroop task 
(Spunt, Lieberman, Cohen, & Eisenberger, 2012). Second, increased dACC and DLPFC activity 
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has been associated with decreasing negative affect and self-reported craving for cigarettes 
(Kober et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2012) due to reappraisal, 
which is consistent with the role of dACC in reducing RT on incongruent Strop trials (Kerns et 
al., 2004). On this basis, it is possible that individual differences in typical reappraisal use might 
recruit functionally coupled dACC and DLPFC activity that support non-affective forms of 
cognitive control during demanding, incongruent trials of the Stroop task (Ochsner & Gross, 
2008).  
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2.0  METHODS 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 155 otherwise healthy adults (78 men, 77 women; M age: 40.7 ± 6.2 SD years, 
range = 30-50 years) who were recruited through mass mailings to residents of Allegheny 
County, PA, USA. All participants were right-handed, fluent in English, in good general health, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and also met the following inclusion criteria: had no 
history of (1) cardiovascular disease (including treatment for or diagnoses of hypertension, 
stroke, myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and atrial or ventricular arrhythmias); (2) 
prior neurosurgery or neurological disorder; (3) any current treatment for or self-reported 
psychiatric disorder; (4) typical consumption of more than 15 alcoholic beverages per week; (5) 
daily use of corticosteroid inhaler; (6) current use of psychotropic, lipid lowering, or any 
cardiovascular medication, including any medication to control blood pressure; (7) metal 
implants or exposure; and (8) claustrophobia. Women were excluded if pregnant (as verified by 
urine test). The ethnicity of the sample was Caucasian/White (70.3%), African American/Black 
(21.9%), Asian (5.8%), and multiracial or other (1.9%). All participants provided informed 
consent prior to completing study protocols, which were approved by the University of 
Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. 
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All analyses for this thesis were based on data from 139 subjects (74 men, 65 women). 
This reduced sample size was due to missing variables needed to compute MetS criteria (n = 3) 
and missing or poor quality functional neuroimaging data (n = 13). These excluded participants 
(4 men, 12 women) did not differ from the final sample with respect to emotion regulation 
measures (described below) or MetS-related measures. However, there was a trend for the 
excluded subjects to be slightly older, t (153) = -1.89, p = 0.06; M = 43.44 ± 5.0 SD vs. M = 
40.39 ± 6.2 SD years. The excluded individuals were largely Caucasian/White (n = 7) and 
African American/Black (n = 8), with one individual identifying their ethnicity as ‘Other’. 
2.2 STUDY PROTOCOL 
All study participants completed three separate assessment protocols that were completed over 3 
visits. However, only data from the first two visits (i.e., session 1 and 2) were used to test the 
aims of this thesis. 
For session 1, participants completed measures that documented their medical histories, 
demographics, and health behaviors. For session 2, participants arrived at the scanning facility 
between the hours of 7:00AM and 11:00am in a fasted stated. Before this fMRI session, 
participants refrained from eating, exercising, and consuming tobacco and caffeinated products 
for 8 h, and drinking alcohol for 12 h prior to this session. Upon arrival, participants were 
assessed for anthropometric measures, fasting blood chemistries, and seated BP. Participants 
then completed the fMRI protocol where data was collected on the Stroop color-word 
interference task. After the fMRI protocol, participants completed several psychosocial 
measures, important among them was the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. 
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2.3 BEHAVIORAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS 
2.3.1 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
Individual differences in the typical use of emotion regulation strategies were assessed with the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ was administered on 
the second visit after participants had completed the neuroimaging protocol. The ERQ is 
comprised of 10-items, each using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). 
Six items assess the tendency to use cognitive reappraisal, while the other four items assess 
habitual use of suppression, with scoring for each subscale determined on the mean of the items. 
There is evidence indicating that the two strategies are distinct (Gross & John, 2003), with a 
more recent factor analysis demonstrating that cognitive reappraisal and suppression utilization 
are independent constructs (Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008). In support of this, within this 
sample, the two emotion regulation strategies were not correlated, r = -0.08, p = 0.33. The scales 
for the two strategies also exhibit reasonable internal consistency (reappraisal, α = 0.79; 
suppression, α = 0.73) and acceptable test-retest reliability (α = 0.69 for both scales; Gross & 
John, 2003) as well as independence from general intelligence (Gross & John, 2003). Moreover, 
consistent with prior work (Drabant et al., 2009; Gross & John, 2003), participant’s ERQ 
reappraisal and suppression use scores did not correlate with verbal IQ as estimated by the 
National Adult Reading Test-Revised (NART-R; ps > 0.49). 
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2.3.2 Assessment of the Metabolic Syndrome 
Participants arrived for a neuroimaging protocol (i.e., Session 2) between 7:00AM and 
11:00AM, after an 8-hour fast. The fast also included abstaining from exercising and consuming 
caffeine, alcohol, and tobacco products. Prior to neuroimaging, participants’ provided a seated, 
resting BP that was measured from the non-dominant arm with an oscillometric device (Critikon 
Dinamap 8100, Johnson & Johnson, Tampa, FL). Participants provided 3 BP readings taken 2 
min apart after a ~20 min acclimation period, with the average of the last 2 of the 3 BP readings 
being used to compute resting systolic (SBP) and diastolic (DBP) blood pressures. Participants’ 
waist circumference (in inches) was measured at the level of the umbilicus to the nearest ½ 
centimeter at end expiration. After each participant’s height, weight, and waist circumference 
were measured, a research nurse performed blood draws. Procedures to determine fasting serum 
lipids and glucose levels were performed in the Department of Primary Care Laboratory Services 
(Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center). 
Concentrations of total cholesterol and triglycerides were measured by a CHOL and triglyceride 
GPO reagent, respectively, using an enzymatic, timed-endpoint method on the SYNCHRON LX 
System (Beckman Coulter, Inc., Brea, California; Allain, Poon, Chan, Richmond, & Fu, 1974; 
Bucolo & David, 1973; Pinter, Hayashi, & Watson, 1967; Roeschlau, Bernt, & Gruber, 1974; 
Trinder, 1969). The concentration of high-density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol was measured 
with a HDLD reagent on the SYNCHRON LX System, which uses an enzymatic, time-endpoint 
method to uniquely facilitate a detergent that solubilizes only the HDL lipoprotein particles 
(Beckman Coulter, Inc., Brea, California; Allain et al., 1974; Roeschlau et al., 1974). Low-
density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol concentrations were estimated by using the Friedewald 
calculation (Friedewald, Levy, & Fredrickson, 1972).  
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The MetS was defined by the criteria of the National Cholesterol Education Program 
(NCEP) Adult Treatment Panel III (Grundy et al., 2004; “Third Report of the National 
Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) Expert Panel on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment 
of High Blood Cholesterol in Adults (Adult Treatment Panel III) final report,” 2002). According 
to NCEP criteria, the MetS is defined as the presence of three or more of the following: (1) 
serum triglycerides > 150 mg/dL; (2) fasting serum glucose > 110 mg/dL; (3) waist 
circumference > 102 cm in men or > 88 cm in women; (4) SBP > 130 or DBP > 85 mm Hg; (5) 
serum HDL cholesterol < 40 mg/dL in men or < 50 mg/dL in women. 
Based on these criteria, the final sample included 22 individuals who met criteria for 
having the MetS and 117 who did not. As follows, the prevalence of the MetS in this study 
population was 15.8%, which is consistent with expected rates of the MetS demonstrated in 
national samples and similar community samples recruited from Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania (Manuck, Phillips, Gianaros, Flory, & Muldoon, 2010; Muldoon et al., 2004, 
2006). Among the 22 with the MetS, the following frequencies were observed across syndrome 
components: low HDL cholesterol (n = 21), elevated waist circumference (n = 19), elevated 
systolic (n = 12) and diastolic (n = 6) blood pressure, elevated triglycerides (n = 11), and 
elevated fasting glucose (n = 8). Among the 117 without the MetS, the following frequencies 
were observed across syndrome components: low HDL cholesterol (n = 38), elevated waist 
circumference (n = 25), elevated systolic (n = 15) and diastolic (n = 12) blood pressure, elevated 
triglycerides (n = 6), and elevated fasting glucose (n = 6).  Across the entire sample, 47 
participants met 0 MetS criteria, 44 met 1 criterion, 26 met 2 criteria, 17 met 3 criteria, 3 met 4 
criteria, and 2 met 5 criteria. Table 1 shows descriptive information about the participants’ 
demographic and health-related characteristics. 
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Table 1.  Summary of participant characteristics 
 
 
 30 
2.3.3 Assessment of Continuous Metabolic Syndrome Score 
The most common conceptualization of the MetS in epidemiological studies is based on a binary 
definition that indicates presence or absence of the syndrome (i.e., coded presence = 1, absence = 
0; Grundy et al., 2004). Despite clinical advantages of this binary approach to characterizing the 
MetS, the multiple definitions and criteria for the syndrome hinders direct comparison of 
findings across studies (Kahn, Buse, Ferrannini, & Stern, 2005). However, recent guidelines 
from the American Diabetes Association and the European Association for the Study of Diabetes 
(Kahn et al., 2005) recommend a continuous MetS score that overcomes certain methodological 
and conceptual limitations: (i) dichotomizing the continuous syndrome components introduces 
the loss of measurement precision, attenuates statistical power, and in some instances increases 
risk for Type I errors in multivariable models (Altman & Royston, 2006; Babyak, 2004; 
MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; Royston, Altman, & Sauerbrei, 2006); (ii) 
syndrome components (i.e., fasting glucose, dyslipidemia, blood pressure, and central adiposity) 
are inherently continuous CVD risk factors which negates the need to dichotomize them 
according to established diagnostic cutoffs (Kahn et al., 2005); and (iii) CVD risk increases 
markedly as individuals meet more criteria for the MetS, further reducing the need to 
dichotomize the MetS as presence or absence. 
Various methods have been implemented to derive the continuous MetS score, including 
principal components analysis (PCA) and standardized residuals (Kahn et al., 2005). Although 
the former PCA methodology factors in the weighted contribution of each syndrome component 
to the latent factor (i.e., defined as the MetS), the inherent issue of weighting variability across 
study populations poses limitations on the generalization of these study-specific, PCA-derived 
weights. In light of this, we determined the cMetS score by standardizing the individual 
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syndrome components (i.e., waist circumference, HDL cholesterol, triglycerides, BP, fasting 
glucose). The standardized BP measure was based on mean arterial pressure (MAP) since 
independently factoring in SBP and DBP would bias the cMetS score with two measures of BP. 
Additionally, the standardized HDL cholesterol values were multiplied by -1 due to the inverse 
association between HDL cholesterol and CVD risk. The standardized residuals (i.e., z-scores) 
for the five syndrome components were summed to create the continuous MetS score. Higher 
continuous MetS score is indicative of a less favorable cardiometabolic profile. 
2.3.4 fMRI Cognitive Control Paradigm 
To probe brain activity in the prefrontal cognitive control network, participants were scanned 
while completing a modified performance-titrated Stroop color-word interference task, which 
has been found to reliably recruit brain regions involved in cognitive control processes (Gianaros 
& Sheu, 2009; Gianaros et al., 2005, 2008, 2007; Sheu et al., 2012). The Stroop task has been 
established as a useful tool for investigating the brain mechanisms that underlie the recruitment 
of cognitive control during instances of decisional conflict and psychological distress. Similarly, 
the variant of the Stroop employed in this study has been shown to consistently increase BOLD 
activation in prefrontal and cingulate cognitive control areas given that participants must process 
conflictual information, receive negative feedback, and make time-pressured responses to 
unpredictable and uncontrollable stimuli that collectively elicit subjective distress (Sheu et al., 
2012). In this modified Stroop task, participants completed six blocks of color-word 
identification trials that lasts for 9 min 20 s and comprised two alternating conditions: a 
congruent condition and an incongruent condition (see Figure 2). Prior to beginning each 
condition, participants fixated on a crosshair that was variably displayed for 10-17 s period. This 
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fixation period was interleaved between each condition block. Following the fixation period, 
each blocked condition instructed participants to identify the physical color in which a target 
word is presented in by selecting one of the four identifier words presented in a row below the 
target word. The target word was visually centered and four identifier word choices were 
randomly ordered in one row at the bottom. Participants selected an identifier word choice by 
pressing one of the four corresponding buttons on a response glove (e.g., thumb button = 
identifier word on the extreme left; ring finger button = identifier word on the extreme right). 
The selected identifier word choice was outlined and participants were provided feedback on 
whether the selection was correct before the next trial. Incorrect selections were highlighted and 
the correct identifier word choice was indicated to participants. For the congruent condition, the 
target word was in a physical color that matched the meaning (e.g., the target word GREEN was 
printed in green). For the incongruent condition, first, the target word appeared in a color that 
was dissimilar from the target word (e.g., the target word GREEN printed in red), and second, all 
the identifier word choices appeared in colors that was different from the color of the identifier 
word choice named. Participants completed three blocks of each condition, with each block 
lasting for 52-60 s.  
An added goal of the modified Stroop task was to control for individual differences in 
task performance. To this end, each participants accuracy at the target word identification was 
performance titrated to (and maintained at) ~60% during each incongruent condition by 
implementing a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) during the incongruent condition that 
adjusted the trial presentation times in 500 ms steps within a range of 1-5 s. Hence, participants 
demonstrating better performance accuracy within a given incongruent condition elicited shorter 
response time windows in which to select an identifier word; conversely, less accurate 
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performance lengthened response windows for participants to identify the target word. For the 
congruent condition, the SOA was fixed across all trials and was determined by the mean SOA 
of the preceding incongruent condition. 
2.3.4.1 Performance and Subjective Ratings of fMRI Paradigm 
During the fMRI paradigm, task accuracy was determined by computing the percentage of trials 
completed correctly. Task accuracy during the incongruent condition of the Stroop task was also 
assessed to ensure performance was titrated below 60% accuracy. As expected, post hoc analyses 
determined that mean accuracy across all participants during the incongruent condition was 
titrated at 56.34% (SD = 8.51). Additional performance change scores (i.e., reaction time) for 
Stroop task were computed by subtracting the congruent condition from the incongruent 
condition. This RT change score between the conditions provided a measure of Stroop 
interference effect (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT). 
Subjective ratings of valence (1, very unhappy; 9 very happy), arousal (1, very calm; 9 
very aroused), and perceived control (1, very little control; 9 very much control) were also 
assessed in the fMRI protocol after the baseline (prestressor) and stressor task periods. Based on 
these numerical ranges, participants completed a self-assessment manikin scale (Bradley & 
Lang, 1994) to report their subjective feelings about the baseline and stressor periods. Task-
related change scores for these subjective ratings were computed by subtracting baseline ratings 
from stressor task (i.e., Stroop) ratings. Baseline rating values were included as covariates in all 
analyses examining the derived subjective change scores. 
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Figure 2. Visual schematic of the modified Stroop color-word interference task  
The Stroop color-word interference task is a validated fMRI paradigm that engages cognitive control brain regions. 
The task had participants identify the color of the target word at the top of the screen during each trial by selecting 
one of the four answer choices below the target word. For illustration purposes, correct responses are indicated with 
a white asterisk above the word. 
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2.4 STATISCAL ANALYSIS 
2.4.1 Demographic, Behavioral, and Cardiometabolic Variables 
The presence or absence of the MetS was treated as a categorical variable in all analyses. 
Descriptive statistics were used to characterize participants with and without the MetS on several 
factors, including age, years of education, smoking status, Stroop task performance and 
subjective ratings, ERQ scores, and MetS components. These group differences were analyzed 
using ANOVA or t tests for continuous variables and χ2 tests for categorical variables. Group 
characteristics are reported as means and standard deviations or as medians and interquartile 
ranges (see Table 1). Pearson product-moment correlation analyses were performed to determine 
the association between Stroop performance variables and subjective ratings relative to type of 
emotion regulation use (i.e., reappraisal, suppression) and continuous MetS score. 
Next, several regression models were conducted examining the association of cognitive 
reappraisal use with each construct of MetS (i.e., presence/absence, number of criteria met, 
continuous MetS score). First, simple logistic regression model was used to test the relationship 
between cognitive reappraisal use and presence/absence of the MetS. In this model, age and 
gender were entered in the first step of the equation, followed by ERQ reappraisal scores. The 
last step entered ERQ suppression scores to examine whether the effects of emotion regulation 
on the presence of MetS was specific to self-reported cognitive reappraisal use. Follow-up 
analyses were then performed by regressing the presence/absence of the individual components 
of the MetS (i.e., low HDL cholesterol or elevated blood pressure, plasma glucose, triglycerides, 
or waist circumference) on ERQ reappraisal scores adjusting for age, sex, and ERQ suppression 
score, similar to the logistic regression model described above. To aid interpretation and clearly 
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convey effect sizes, positive logistic regression coefficients are presented alongside odds ratios 
(OR; the exponentiated regression coefficient, eB), and negative logistic regression coefficients 
alongside inverse odds ratios (IOR; the inverse of the exponentiated regression coefficient, 1/ 
eB). Second, negative binomial models were conducted to examine the association between 
cognitive reappraisal use and number of MetS criteria met across the full sample of 139 
participants. For these models, the number of MetS criteria met (ranging from 0-5) was regressed 
on age, gender, and ERQ reappraisal and suppression scores together in one model. These 
negative binomial results are presented alongside the exponentiated regression coefficients, and 
these can be interpreted as the change in number of criteria met per unit change in predictor of 
interest. Finally, ordinary least squares regression models were conducted to test whether 
cognitive reappraisal use covaried with continuous MetS scores. In this model, age and gender 
were entered in the first step of the equation, ERQ reappraisal scores in step 2, followed by ERQ 
suppression scores in the third, final step. All data were analyzed with Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0. 
2.4.2 MRI Data Acquisition 
All participants were scanned within a 3Tesla Trio TIM whole-body MRI scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany), equipped with a 12-channel phased-array head coil to acquire data from the 
entire brain. Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired while participants completed the Stroop task 
within the scanner. To acquire the blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) images from these 
functional scans, the following parameters were applied to a gradient-echo EPI sequence: field-
of-view (FOV) = 205 x 206 mm2, matrix size = 64 x 64 mm2, time-to-repetition (TR) = 2,000 
ms, time-to-echo (TE) = 28 ms, and flip angle (FA) = 90º. Thirty-nine slices (3-mm thick, no 
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gap) were obtained in an interleaved sequence in an inferior-to-superior direction, yielding 280 
BOLD images (three initial discarded images, allowing for magnetic equilibration). We also 
obtained structural scans in order to facilitate with the spatial coregistration of the BOLD 
images. These T1-weighted 3D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) 
neuroanatomical images were acquired over 7 min 17 s by these parameters: FOV = 256 × 208 
mm2, matrix size = 256 × 208 mm2, TR = 2,100 ms BOLD images were acquired over the task 
period with a gradient-echo EPI sequence by these parameters ms, time-to-inversion (TI) = 1,100 
ms, TE = 3.29 ms, and FA = 8° (192 slices, 1-mm thick, no gap). 
2.4.3 fMRI Data Preprocessing 
Neuroimaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using Stiatistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM8; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, Institute of Neurology, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The preprocessing steps included (i) image realignment; (ii) 
coregistration; (iii) normalization; and (iv) smoothing. Specifically, prior to basic fMRI analyses, 
BOLD images were spatially realigned to the first image in the run using a six-parameter rigid-
body transformation. Realignment was performed to correct for head movements. These 
realigned images were then coregistered to each participant’s T1-weighted structural image. After 
the coregistration step, the images were then normalized by a 12-parameter affine transformation 
to the International Consortium for Brain Mapping 152 template (Montreal Neurological 
Institute; MNI). Lastly, spatial smoothing was applied to these normalized images with a 6-mm 
full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
After preprocessing, planned individual contrast maps were generated at fixed-effects 
level for each participant to investigate neural activity separately during the incongruent and 
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congruent conditions compared to baseline (fixation crosshairs) and to each other. These 
estimated contrast images corresponded to (i) “incongruent vs. congruent”, (ii) “incongruent vs. 
fixation”, and (iii) “congruent vs. fixation”. However, much of the analyses in this project 
focused on the “incongruent vs. congruent” contrast maps as they presumably capture the 
interference effects of conflict manipulation tasks, including the Stroop paradigm, where task-
relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus features are in conflict with each other (e.g.,(Bradley & 
Lang, 1994). Together, these contrasts permitted a determination of whether activation 
differences as a function of individual differences in use of reappraisal generalized across 
varying task conditions or were specific to activation patterns differentially elicited by 
incongruent versus congruent conditions (“incongruent > congruent” BOLD signal change). To 
this end, the incongruent, congruent, and fixation task conditions were modeled with rectangular 
waveforms that were convolved with the default SPM8 hemodynamic response function (HRF). 
For each participant, condition effects for each individual contrast image were estimated using 
the general linear model (GLM). These individual contrast maps were then utilized in further 
random effects whole brain and region-of-interest (ROI) group-level analyses across all 
participants. Of note, head movement parameters (3 translations, 3 rotations) derived from the 
realignment preprocessing step were included in these GLMs as regression vectors to account for 
BOLD signal changes due to head motion. Also, before GLM estimation, a 187-s temporal high-
pass filter was applied to the data to account for low-frequency BOLD signal artifacts. 
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2.4.4 Basic fMRI Analysis 
2.4.4.1 Main Effect Analysis 
To examine neural activity reflecting Stroop color-word interference, region-of-interest (ROI) 
and whole-brain group-level analyses were performed that compared BOLD response during the 
incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition (i.e., “incongruent > congruent”). 
Hence, these initial main effect analyses both at the whole-brain and ROI level were conducted 
on these contrast images for each individual to confirm that the Stroop color-word interference 
task reliably engaged specific cognitive control brain regions (e.g., dACC, DLPFC) of interest.. 
First, based on a-priori predictions regarding the involvement of prefrontal and cingulate systems 
in implementing reappraisal and cognitive control, ROI analyses were performed to examine the 
effects of the incongruent Stroop condition on specific brain regions that jointly (i) monitor and 
initiate the demand for attentional control during response conflict (Bush et al., 2000; Kerns et 
al., 2004; MacDonald et al., 2000; Mohanty et al., 2007; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), and (ii) 
select and apply cognitive reappraisal strategies to reduce negative affect (Kalisch, 2009; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2008; Quirk & Beer, 2006). With respect to these existing 
reviews, these a-priori cognitive control ROIs were limited to Broadmann areas (BA) 9, 10, 24 
and 32 in the medial PFC, and BA 8, 9, 10, 44, 45, 46, and 47 in the dorsal and ventral portions 
of the lateral PFC (see Section 2.4.4.2. on Region of Interest Analyses). Next, whole-brain 
analyses were performed to fully explore the neural regions beyond the above prefrontal cortical 
regions that are related to differential activity during the incongruent Stroop condition (vs. 
congruent condition) across each voxel in the brain. Additional ROI and whole-brain analyses 
were conducted on the contrast images reflecting brain activation related to “incongruent > 
fixation” to account for the incongruent color-word properties among three of the four response 
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choices during the congruent trials (see Figure 2). These alternate word choices serve as 
competitive response stimuli because they are part of the same color set as the correct answer 
choice, which may divert attention towards this stimulus dimension (i.e., color). Moreover, the 
congruent trials present another level of conflict by introducing task-irrelevant stimulus 
properties in word stimuli choices that is not consistent with the ink color (e.g., the word RED 
and GREEN are printed in red ink). Hence, it is important to consider the BOLD signal changes 
that reflect “incongruent > fixation” since this comparison condition (“fixation”) is not 
confounded by the slightly conflictual aspects of the congruent condition. All ROI and whole-
brain analyses were thresholded at p < 0.005 with a 20-voxel cluster (k) extent threshold. All 
brain coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) format. 
2.4.4.2 Region of Interest Analyses 
Given our a-priori hypotheses regarding the relationship between cognitive reappraisal, 
autonomic physiology relevant to the MetS, and prefrontal cortical regions, several ROI analyses 
focusing on various prefrontal and cingulate regions were performed. The dACC (BA 24/32) 
ROIs were anatomically defined according to a four-region model of the cingulate cortex (Yu et 
al., 2011). From this model, ROI 4 was used for our dACC ROI (see Figure 1 in Yu et al., 2011) 
due to its positive connectivity with the fronto-parietal cognitive control network that has 
previously been linked to individual differences in reappraisal use (Drabant et al., 2009). The 
dimensions for this dACC ROI had a center of mass of x = -2, y = 21, and z = 26. It extended 
along the x- y- and z- directions from a minimum (min) x-coordinate of 8 mm to a maximum 
(max) x-coordinate of -12 mm; a min y of 34 mm to a max y of 8 mm; a min z of 36 mm to a 
max z of 15 mm. It had a volume of 3294 mm3. The anatomic boundaries for the other ROIs 
within the medial, lateral, and ventral PFC regions (i.e., BA 8, 9, 10, 44, 45, 46, 47) were defined 
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using the respective Broadmann areas from the Talairach Daemon database within 
WFU_PickAtlas toolbox (Lancaster et al., 2000; Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003; 
http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas).  
These prefrontal and cingulate ROIs were used to address two questions. First, we 
examined the main effect of neural activity within each prefrontal and cingulate ROI during the 
incongruent vs. congruent contrast. Next, we examined whether activity in these ROIs correlated 
with ERQ reappraisal scores and the MetS. To examine this, mean parameter estimates for each 
participant were extracted from the ROIs during the “incongruent > congruent” contrast image. 
These parameter estimates within these ROIs were determined by the eigenvariate option 
wherein the first eigenvariate value was extracted from 3D spheres of 5-mm radius centered on 
the voxel of maximum activity within the ROIs for each participant. These parameter estimates 
were submitted to SPSS for further correlational and regression analyses. 
To examine whether cognitive reappraisal use was associated with increased BOLD 
response within these cognitive control ROIs, correlational analyses were run that related ERQ 
reappraisal scores to ROI parameter estimates. Follow-up partial correlation analyses examined 
whether the association persisted after controlling for age, sex, and ERQ suppression scores. 
We conducted various regression models to examine whether the MetS (i.e., 
presence/absence, number of criteria met, continuous MetS score) was associated with decreased 
neural activity within these prefrontal cognitive control ROIs. These regression models are 
similar to those reported in Section 2.4.1. The association between presence of the MetS and 
neural activity within each ROI was determined through simple logistic regression models 
adjusting for age and gender in Step 1, followed by neural activity in each of these a-priori 
ROIs. The association between number of syndrome criteria met and neural activity in each ROI 
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was tested with negative binomial models. Hence, separate binomial models were run for each 
ROI, such that the number of MetS criteria met (ranging from 0-5) was regressed on age, gender, 
and neural activity within a specific prefrontal cortical ROI. Lastly, correlational analyses were 
used to test whether neural activity in each ROI was associated with continuous MetS scores. 
Follow-up partial correlation analyses examined whether the association persisted after 
controlling for age, sex. For all these analyses, a Bonferroni-corrected α-level of 0.004 was used 
as the criterion of statistical significance in order to account for multiple comparisons and 
maintain the 5% Type I error rate. 
2.4.4.3 Whole Brain Analyses 
Additional whole-brain analyses were performed to supplement the ROI analyses and to 
completely explore the neural regions during incongruent conditions relative to the congruent 
condition across the entire brain. Next, we performed whole-brain regression analyses within 
SPM8 examining the correlations between neural activity during the incongruent vs. congruent 
conditions and self-reported reappraisal and suppression use. Age and gender were added to 
these models to account for the age- and gender-related differential activity in prefrontal cortical 
brain regions during cognitive reappraisal (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012; Opitz, 
Rauch, Terry, & Urry, 2012). To determine the specificity of reappraisal use in predicting neural 
activity, additional whole-brain regression models were run controlling for another common 
form of emotion regulation, namely suppression use, alongside age and gender. 
2.4.4.4 Psychophysiological Interactions 
With respect to our exploratory hypotheses, we performed a psychophysiological interaction 
analysis (PPI; Friston et al., 1997) to identify prefrontal cortical regions (i.e., DLPFC) exhibiting 
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an increase in correlation with the dACC BOLD signal activity during the incongruent condition. 
In extension, an added goal was to test whether cognitive reappraisal use and the MetS was 
related to the incongruent-specific temporal covariation between dACC and DLPFC regions that 
might be functionally implicated in mediating cognitive control processes underlying conflict 
resolution (Mohanty et al., 2007) as well as emotion regulation (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 
2012).  For these PPI analyses, the dACC ROI was selected as our “seed” region (see Section 
2.4.4.2. on Region of Interest Analyses) for several reasons. Most conflict models of cognitive 
control emphasize a unidirectional flow of informational between prefrontal cognitive control 
networks, with the dACC exhibiting a broad role in modulating the need for cognitive control 
from DLPFC regions that resolve response conflict (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Sallet et al., 2011). 
Consistent with this, MacDonald et al. (2000) found that the dACC was more active during 
incongruent trials of the Stroop while DLPFC was more active during the act of selecting the 
color name, which together converges with the presumptive conflict monitoring roles of the 
dACC in monitoring for conflictual, incongruent stimuli and the DLPFC in maintaining 
representations of task goals through behavior adjustments. Further, Nee, Wager, & Jonides 
(2007) indicated that increased conflict-related ACC activity characterized the incongruent vs. 
congruent contrasts to greater extent than the greater DLPFC activity that appears to be exhibited 
during incongruent vs. fixation/neutral contrasts.  Hence, since the exploratory hypotheses were 
based on conflict models of cognitive control, identifying the dACC as a “seed” region for this 
cognitive control neural network agreed with theoretical and experimental evidence that the 
dACC informs subsequent activity in DLPFC depending on psychological context. 
Towards that end, we employed PPI analyses that utilized multiple regression models to 
isolate the brain regions exhibiting functional coupling with the dACC ROI as a function of  
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experimental design or task manipulation (“incongruent > congruent”). For PPI analyses, the 
functional coupling between the various brain regions serves as the physical component while 
the different task conditions define the psychological component. These two components 
characterize two of the three vectors within the PPI design matrix. The third vector is an 
interaction term of the physical and psychological vectors that provides a PPI measure or rather a 
correlation in neural activity between the dACC “seed” region and the functionally coupled brain 
regions that differ between “incongruent vs. congruent” conditions. Thus, significant PPI 
measures indicate that coactivation between the dACC “seed” region and different brain regions 
were significantly greater during incongruent conditions of the Stroop task than congruent 
conditions.    
 To perform the PPI analyses, individual time-series were extracted for each participant 
from the BOLD signal activity in all voxels within a 5 mm radius sphere around the peak 
activation voxel of dACC ROI mask. Next, this dACC BOLD signal time-series was mean-
centered and submitted to a deconvolution algorithm using the canonical SPM8 HRF. Following 
deconvolution, the PPI vector was defined as the interaction term of the deconvolved dACC ROI 
time-series and a vector coding for the two main effects of the Stroop task (incongruent, 
congruent). This time-series by task condition interaction vector was re-convolved with the 
SPM8 HRF to create the final PPI vector. To examine the effect of this PPI task-by-seed 
interaction term, activity within the dACC ROI mask was regressed on a voxel-wise basis 
against this interaction term. This resulted in estimated individual PPI contrast images that were 
entered into second-level random effects analysis in which task-dependent effects (“incongruent 
> congruent”) were tested using one-sample t-tests. These random effects analyses on the 
individual PPI maps identified any brain areas that exhibited activity that covaried with that of 
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the dACC significantly more during the incongruent than congruent task, and vice versa. 
Significant clusters exhibiting PPI-related dACC coupling were identified with a voxel-wide 
threshold of p < 0.005 with a 20-voxel extent threshold. 
 Additional regression models as describe in Section 2.4.1. were used to test whether a 
measure of task-dependent functional connectivity between dACC-DLPFC was associated with 
ERQ reappraisal scores and the three measures of the MetS. An extracted PPI beta estimate 
reflecting the coupling between the dACC and DLPFC ROI was used in these analyses. 
2.4.4.5 Exploratory Mediation Analyses 
For each of the prefrontal and cingulate ROIs that were significantly related to habitual cognitive 
reappraisal use and/or MetS, we performed an exploratory mediation analyses to test whether 
cognitive control-related neural activity within these ROIs might partially explain the link 
between individual differences in reappraisal use and the MetS. Based on our results (see Section 
3.4 in Results), none of the individual prefrontal and cingulate ROIs met criteria for a test of 
mediation. Instead, the dACC-DLPFC functional connectivity values were submitted to 
mediation analyses to test for the indirect effect of cognitive reappraisal on the MetS through this 
cortico-cortical functional pathway between the dACC and the DLPFC. More precisely, we used 
the product-of-coefficients strategy that tests the significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path 
through the mediator) by bootstrapping the product of the effect of the independent variable on 
the mediator (path a), and the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable accounting for the 
effect of the independent variable (path b). However, the sampling distribution of the indirect 
effect that is determined through the ab product of coefficients is subject to violations of 
normality when the possibility of mediation is present (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Hence, Preacher 
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& Hayes (2008) recommend using a bootstrapping approach whereby 5000 estimates of ab are 
used to calculate confidence intervals (CIs) and standard errors around the indirect effect.     
In these mediation analyses, ERQ reappraisal scores served as the independent variable, 
presence of the MetS, the number of MetS criteria met, or continuous MetS score served as the 
dependent variable, dACC-DLPFC PPI estimates served as the mediator, and age, gender, and 
ERQ suppression scores were included as covariates. These mediation analyses were scripted 
within SPSS 20.0 using the INDIRECT macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
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3.0  RESULTS 
3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC AND CLINICAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Demographic characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 1. As expected, participants 
that met criteria for the MetS exhibited significantly poorer outcomes on all components of the 
syndrome. Individuals with the MetS also showed increased high sensitivity C-reactive protein 
(CRP) levels. 
Although there was no gender difference in the prevalence of the MetS in this sample, χ2 
(1, 139) = 0.02, p = 0.89, there were gender differences in the syndrome components. 
Specifically, the means of waist circumference, fasting glucose and triglyceride levels, and 
systolic and diastolic BP were higher in men relative to women, ts < 2.54, ps < 0.02. In addition, 
men had lower levels of HDL-cholesterol than women, t = -4.70, p < 0.00001. Further, men had 
a higher continuous MetS score than women, t (137) = -4.66, p < 0.00001; men: M = 1.22, SD = 
2.84; women: M = 1.39, SD = 3.77. Low HDL-cholesterol was the most frequent component in 
men (45.9%) followed by high BP (29.7%), high waist circumference (20.3%), high triglycerides 
(17.6%), and high fasting glucose (10.8%). For women, high waist circumference (44.6%) was 
the most frequent component followed by low HDL-cholesterol (38.5), high BP (20%), high 
fasting glucose (9.2%), and high triglycerides (6.2%). 
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For everyday use of emotion regulation strategies, men made less habitual use of 
reappraisal compared to women, t (137) = -2.77, p = 0.006; men: M = 30.42, SD = 5.64; women: 
M = 33.06, SD = 5.59. In contrast, men reported greater habitual use of suppression relative to 
women, t (137) = -2.96, p = 0.004; men: M = 14.54, SD = 4.71; women: M = 12.34, SD = 3.98. 
This finding is consistent with reports that women tend to utilize suppression less as an emotion 
regulatory strategy than men (Gross & John, 2003). Age was positively associated with habitual 
use of suppression, r = 0.19, p = 0.03, although no relationship was found with reappraisal use. 
3.2 BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE AND RATINGS 
3.2.1 Behavioral Performance and Affective Responses to Stroop Task 
There were significant differences in reaction time and accuracy between the incongruent and 
congruent trials of the Stroop task (see Table 1). Consistent with the conflict-monitoring 
hypothesis (Botvinick et al., 2004), during the fMRI testing session, incongruent trials were 
associated with a longer reaction/response time (RT) relative to congruent trials, t (138) = 32.53, 
p < 0.01; incongruent: M = 1811.70 ms, SD = 420.19 ms; congruent: M = 1278.94 ms, SD = 
274.89 ms.  
The Stroop task relative to the baseline period led to a significant increase in self-reported 
ratings of arousal, t (137) = -16.43, ps < 0.01, and decreased ratings of perceived control and 
positive valence, ts (137) > 9.94, ps < 0.01. This confirms that the Stroop task was subjectively 
distressing. Interestingly, there was a gender difference in the change in self-reported control, 
with women reporting a greater loss of control following the completion of the Stroop task 
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(relative to baseline) compared to men, t (136) = 2.53, ps < 0.05; men: M = -1.53, SD = 2.27; 
women: M = -2.54; SD = 2.39. Thus, along with the conflictual nature of the incongruent Stroop 
condition, individuals also reported that the Stroop task was largely arousing, distressing, and 
marked by a loss of control. 
Taken together, the behavioral responses and the subjective ratings elicited by the Stroop 
task indicate that the incongruent condition produced an interference effect and a concomitant 
unpleasant emotional state that was characterized by increased arousal and decreased valence 
and perceived control. It is interesting to note that the behavioral demands of the incongruent 
condition (i.e., as reflected by the Stroop RT interference effect) did not covary with self-
reported changes in any of the subjective ratings (ps > 0.25). Hence, the Stroop task appears to 
evoke a state of subjective distress that is apparently dissociable from or independent of 
observable behavioral performance on the task itself. Thus, in the face of the same task and 
behavioral demands, individuals differ significantly in the extent to which they report changes in 
affect, arousal, and control. Put differently, it does not appear that worse performance necessarily 
evokes more distress across subjects. 
3.2.2 Emotion Regulation and Behavioral and Affective Responses to Stroop Task 
Next tested was whether individual differences in the typical use of reappraisal or expressive 
suppression associate with task performance and subjective ratings during the Stroop task. 
Accuracy did not exhibit any significant associations with everyday use of reappraisal or 
expressive suppression (i.e., percentage of correct trials in the incongruent and congruent Stroop 
conditions did not covary with reappraisal or suppression, ps > 0.61). The RT data appeared to 
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converge with these findings, with reappraisal and expressive suppression showing no significant 
correlations with RT (all ps > 0.05).  
No associations were found between habitual use of reappraisal and change in perceived 
control or arousal following the Stroop task after adjusting for age, gender, and baseline ratings 
for the respective subjective scores (ps > 0.22). Although there were outliers (scores > 3 SDs 
from the mean) in the subjective change scores for the arousal (n = 1) and control (n = 1) 
distributions, these results remained nonsignificant even after removal of these individuals’ data. 
However, everyday reappraisal use was positively associated with self-reported change in 
valence following the Stroop task after controlling for age, sex, and baseline valence ratings, 
rpartial = 0.17, p = 0.046. Of note, use of expressive suppression in everyday life was not 
associated with any of the subjective rating measures (ps > 0.53). 
3.2.3 Effect of the Metabolic Syndrome on Behavioral and Affective Responses to Stroop 
Task 
Additional analyses also examined whether the MetS related to Stroop performance and task-
related changes in self-reported ratings on arousal, valence, and control. Presence or absence of 
the MetS did not covary with Stroop performance (i.e., RT, accuracy rates; all ps > 0.62). 
Similarly, number of MetS criteria met or the continuous MetS score demonstrated no 
association with on the two Stroop performance measures (all ps > 0.05).  
ANCOVAs revealed no significant between-group differences for the MetS on change in 
arousal, valence, or perceived control after adjustments age, gender, and the respective baseline 
rating for each subjective scale (all ps > 0.19). It is interesting to note that there was a trend for 
individuals with the MetS to report greater loss of perceived control following the Stroop task as 
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compared to those not meeting MetS criteria, F (1, 132) = 1.80, p = 0.18, after adjustment for 
age, sex, and baseline control rating.  Hence, although individuals with the MetS experienced 
increases in arousal and distress coupled with reduced control during the Stroop task relative to 
baseline (see Table 1), these differences were not significant. Neither number of syndrome 
criteria met nor the continuous MetS score were associated with any change scores in subjective 
ratings (all ps > 0.23). 
3.3 EMOTION REGULATION AND THE METABOLIC SYNDROME 
First, to replicate previous reports (Kinnunen et al., 2005), we tested for the associations between 
cognitive reappraisal use and the various constructs of MetS. As expected, individuals who 
exhibited a tendency to use cognitive reappraisal were less likely to have the MetS after 
adjusting for age and sex, β = -0.72, SE = 0.25, OR = 0.485, IOR = 2.06, p = 0.004. Here, a 
decrease of one standard deviation in everyday use of cognitive reappraisal was associated with a 
2.06 times increased odds of meeting criteria for the MetS. More importantly, this relationship 
between habitual reappraisal use and presence of the MetS remained significant even when 
accounting for suppression use (p = 0.003). Similar results were observed with number of MetS 
criteria met. Specifically, negative binomial models revealed that habitual reappraisal use was 
inversely associated with number of syndrome components met, β = -0.16, SE = 0.08, eB = 0.85, 
p = 0.039, above and beyond age, sex, and expressive suppressive use. Lastly, the tendency to 
use cognitive reappraisal negatively covaried with continuous MetS score, β = -0.18, t = - 2.24, p 
= 0.027, after controlling for demographic covariates and suppression use (Figure 5). Combined, 
everyday reappraisal use is associated with a reduced likelihood of meeting criteria for the MetS, 
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meeting fewer MetS criteria, and having a lower cardiometabolic risk profile above-and-beyond 
demographic factors and other common forms of emotion regulation (i.e., expressive 
suppression) related to cardiovascular health (Mauss & Gross, 2002). 
Among the syndrome components, individual differences in reappraisal use were 
inversely associated with meeting criteria for elevated triglycerides, β = -0.68, SE = 0.28, IOR = 
1.96, p = 0.015, and elevated waist circumference, β = -0.48, SE = 0.20, IOR = 1.61, p = 0.019, 
after adjusting for demographic factors and suppression use. Conversely, although suppression 
use was not associated with the MetS, there was evidence of a positive trend between the 
tendency to suppress emotional behavior and meeting criteria for reduced HDL-cholesterol, β = 
0.33, SE = 0.19, IOR = 0.72, p = 0.087, net the influence of age, sex, and reappraisal use. Hence, 
it seems that individual differences in use of emotion regulation strategies are associated with 
presence of specific syndrome components. 
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Figure 3. Main effect of MetS group on ERQ reappraisal and suppression scores. 
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Figure 4. Relationship between number of metabolic syndrome criteria met and ERQ reappraisal and 
suppression scores. 
  
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot illustrating the inverse relationship between ERQ reappraisal scores and continuous 
MetS score. 
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3.4 FMRI RESULTS 
3.4.1 Neural Correlates of Stroop Color-Wood Interference Task 
ROI and whole-brain main effect analyses were performed on the Stroop task to determine which 
brain regions showed an enhanced BOLD response during incongruent compared with congruent 
task conditions. Consistent with prior work, brain activity within the control-related prefrontal 
and cingulate ROIs was significantly greater during the “incongruent > congruent” contrast. 
Similarly, whole-brain analyses indicated that the incongruent condition produced greater 
activation in prefrontal and cingulate areas previously identified in studies of cognitive control of 
emotion through reappraisal (Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2012; 
Phillips et al., 2008), including mPFC/dACC (BA 32), DLPFC (BA 9/46), (BA 47), and lateral 
OFC (BA 10; see Figure 6A, 6B, and Table 2). We did observe a brain-behavior relationship 
between left VLPFC activity and Stroop RT interference effect (r = 0.24, p = 0.004), which is 
consistent with a presumed functional role of the left inferior frontal gyrus as an executive 
control mechanism engaged by conflictual working memory tasks that involve language 
processing (e.g., Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Persson, Sylvester, & Jonides, 2009). In addition to 
engaging these prefrontal cognitive control areas, the incongruent condition of the Stroop task 
activated other brain regions that likely support behavioral performance in the context of task-
related cognitive and autonomic physiological changes, including insula, cerebellum, 
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supplementary motor area (BA 6), and superior temporal (BA 22) and parietal lobule (BA 7; 
Fechir et al., 2010; Gianaros, Onyewuenyi, Sheu, Christie, & Critchley, 2012). 
3.4.2 Neural Correlates of Emotion Regulation 
The next set of analyses examined whether self-reported use of emotion regulation strategies 
covaried with functionally-defined, prefrontal and cingulate ROIs (i.e., dACC, DLPFC, VLPFC, 
lateral OFC) identified during the incongruent condition of the modified Stroop task.  
Contrary to our hypotheses and other reports (Drabant et al., 2009; Vanderhasselt et al., 
2012) self-reported reappraisal use did not demonstrate any significant positive or negative 
associations with BOLD response restricted to a priori ROIs within the dACC, DLPFC, VLPFC, 
lateral OFC, -0.001 < rs < -0.059, ps > 0.10. These findings remained in subsequent hierarchical 
regression analyses including age and sex as covariates. Similarly, suppression use was not 
associated with BOLD response in these prefrontal and cingulate ROIs. Additional whole-brain 
regressions analyses within SPM replicated the null findings demonstrated with the ROIs. 
3.4.3 Neural Correlates of the Metabolic Syndrome 
Next, the effect of the MetS (i.e., presence or absence, number of criteria, and cMetS score) on 
BOLD activation values in these a priori ROIs was also examined. However, inconsistent with 
some previous studies (Hoth et al., 2011), we failed to find an association between any of the 
three MetS construct measures and BOLD response signal changes within our prefrontal and 
cingulated ROIs, even when less conservative statistical thresholds were used (ps > 0.10). 
 58 
Additional whole-brain regressions analyses within SPM replicated the null findings 
demonstrated with the ROIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Main effects of the Stroop color-word interference task: incongruent > congruent. 
Statistical parametric maps showing sagittal view of dACC (BA 32) activations extending into 
supplementary motor areas. T-values are represented by the intensity of the activation. 
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-
 
- 
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Statistical parametric maps showing axial view of DLPFC and VLPFC activations as well as insular regions. T-
values 
are represented by the intensity of the activation. 
Figure 7. Main effects of the Stroop color-word interference task: incongruent > congruent. 
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Table 2.  Brain areas showing significantly increased BOLD activity for the 
‘Incongruent > Congruent’ condition contrast in random effects model (see Figures 6 and 7)  
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Table 3.  Brain areas showing significantly increased BOLD activity for the 
‘Congruent > Incongruent’ condition contrast in random effects model (see Figures 6 and 7)  
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Table 4.  Brain areas showing significantly greater functional connectivity with 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex seed during the performance of the ‘Incongruent’ condition of 
the Stroop task    
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Figure 8. Functional connectivity map illustrating right DLPFC regions that evidenced positive 
correlated activity with the dACC seed region during the incongruent Stroop conditions. 
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3.4.4 Functional Interactions between dACC and DLPFC 
The final step in the fMRI analyses examined whether the BOLD response signal changes during 
the “incongruent > congruent” contrast could be characterized by increased functional 
connectivity within an established cognitive control network, particularly between the dACC and 
DLPFC. We tested this hypothesis by conducting exploratory PPI analyses that were constrained 
to correlated neural activity in the dACC and DLPFC ROIs. Further, we explored whether 
temporally coupled BOLD signal changes in the dACC and DLPFC covaried with self-reported 
reappraisal and suppression use and as well as our various constructs of the MetS. 
PPI analyses indicated that activity in the dACC “seed” exhibited task-related positive 
functional connectivity with the DLPFC (BA9/46). Additional whole-brain analyses confirmed 
that dACC activity was more strongly positively correlated with regions of the DLPFC during 
the incongruent trials than during the congruent trials (see Figure 8, Table 3). 
3.4.4.1 Correlates of dACC and DLPFC Functional Connectivity 
Next, we examined whether the task-dependent coupling of the dACC with the right DLPFC was 
associated with individual differences in typical emotion regulation use and the MetS. First, we 
found a positive relationship between cognitive reappraisal use and functional connectivity 
between the dACC and a cluster within the DLPFC ROI (x,y,z 52, 22, 26) during incongruent 
trials, net the influence of age and gender (β = 0.21, t = 2.45, p = 0.016). Moreover, this positive 
dACC-DLPFC connectivity was inversely associated with presence of the MetS, number of 
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syndrome criteria met, and the continuous MetS score after adjusting for age, gender, and 
suppression use (ps < 0.006).  
We also observed a brain-behavior relationship between dACC-DLPFC connectivity and 
accuracy during the incongruent Stroop trials (r = 0.26, p = 0.002) that agrees with the evidence 
that increased crosstalk between these two cortical regions is involved in implementing 
behavioral adjustments during task conflict (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004). 
3.4.5 Mediation Effects of dACC and DLPFC Functional Connectivity on Emotion 
Regulation and the Metabolic Syndrome 
In these exploratory mediation analyses, we found that the positive dACC-DLPFC connectivity 
significantly mediated the relationship between reappraisal use and the MetS (ab indirect effect = 
-0.2163, 95% CI = -0.5368 to -0.0203; see Figure 10) after adjusting for age, gender, and 
suppression use. Based on the direction of the paths, these mediation effects suggest that 
individuals who frequently use cognitive reappraisal may be at lesser MetS risk in part via an 
enhanced capacity to recruit prefrontal brain circuits when negative affective states demand 
cognitive control.  
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Figure 9. Mediation results with PPI analyses.  
Bootstrapped paths show that dACC-DLPFC functional connectivity during incongruent conditions, 
mediated the inverse relation between reappraisal use and continuous MetS score. 
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
The process model of emotion regulation supports the hypothesis that individual differences in 
the use of reappraisal and suppression could plausibly relate to negative cardiovascular health 
outcomes (DeSteno et al., in press; John & Gross, 2004; Mauss & Gross, 2004). However, no 
studies have yet characterized the potential neural pathways through which different forms of 
cognitive emotion regulation may relate to measures of cardiovascular health (DeSteno et al., in 
press). Accordingly, the goal of the present study was to characterize neural activity changes in 
brain regions that support cognitive control processes and presumably emotion regulation 
processes and then link these neural changes to individual differences in self-reported reappraisal 
and suppression, as well as to three measures of the MetS. First, cognitive reappraisal use was 
inversely associated with the MetS; suppression was not associated with the MetS or associated 
components. Second, increased cognitive reappraisal use and the reduce likelihood of having the 
MetS covaried with a more positive functional connectivity between the dACC and DLPFC. 
Third, and more importantly, this positive dACC-DLPFC connectivity mediated the association 
between cognitive reappraisal use and the MetS, such that individuals who frequently use 
cognitive reappraisal may be at lesser MetS risk in part via an enhanced capacity to recruit 
prefrontal cognitive control systems during negative affective states. 
 Our first set of findings indicates that individuals who habitually use reappraisal were 
less likely to have the MetS. There was also evidence that inter-individual variation in 
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reappraisal use was specific to central adiposity and dyslipidemia. However, it is noteworthy that 
individuals meeting an increasing number of MetS criteria showed a graded reduction in 
reappraisal use, which implies that the aggregate clustering of multiple MetS components relates, 
in a dose-response manner, to less frequent use of presumably adaptive cognitive strategies to 
regulate negative emotion. Further, there was an inverse relationship between reappraisal use and 
the continuous MetS score that is thought to reflect one’s overall cardiometabolic risk. Together, 
these results are consistent with a 6-year prospective study showing that trait-like use of 
cognitive emotion regulation predicts reduced presence of the MetS (Kinnunen et al., 2005).  
 The affective and cognitive consequences of cognitive reappraisal may represent two 
possible pathways through which this specific emotion regulation strategy might relate to 
negative cardiovascular health outcomes (John & Gross, 2004). With respect to affective 
consequences, appraisals of potentially negative situations could serve to initiate the emotional 
experience and/or reframe the emotional meaning of these situations (Gross, 1999; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1966). Reappraising negative or otherwise distressing situations with 
cognitive reappraisal strategies has been shown to diminish negative affect as well as increase 
positive emotions (Gross & John, 2003; Webb et al., 2012). Hence, individuals tend to consider 
cognitive reappraisal (as opposed to behavioral suppression) as an adaptive emotion control 
strategy when regulating negative emotions, as it reduces the subjective experience of negative 
affect, enhances cognitive resources, and the evokes no pronounced effects on the autonomic 
components of emotional responding (Gross, 2002; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Webb et al., 
2012). Along these lines, given the increased prevalence of negative emotionality among 
individuals with the MetS (Tamashiro, 2011), there is reason to believe that typical use of 
adaptive reappraisal strategies might demonstrate an inverse association with the MetS by 
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resolving the unhealthy subjective, behavioral, and physiological pathways through which 
negative emotions influence risk for the MetS (Goldbacher & Matthews, 2007). This adaptive 
role of cognitive emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraisal, within the context of CVD 
risk may be imparted through a range of cognitive control abilities that help maintain an 
emotional appraisal of a situation in mind (working memory), inhibit the proponent emotional 
response regarding the situation (response inhibition), create different interpretations of the 
situation (working memory), monitor subjective affect to track the efficacy of the regulatory 
strategy (performance monitoring), and monitor for conflicts between early emotional appraisal 
and cognitively restructured (conflict monitoring; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Indeed, reappraisal 
use to reduce negative affect presents minimal ‘cognitive cost’ to the individual (Gross, 2002; 
John & Gross, 2004) and has been shown to actually prime cognitive resources through the 
enhancement of memory and cognitive control functions (Moser, Most, & Simons, 2010). That 
being said, the capacity to integrate these cognitive control abilities may facilitate the efficient 
use of cognitive reappraisal, with recent reports showing that individual differences in working 
memory capacity, set-shifting, and response inhibition might collectively be involved in 
reappraisal (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; McRae et al., 2012; Schmeichel et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, deficits in these cognitive control abilities are characteristic among individuals 
with the MetS, with converging neurobiological evidence suggesting that the executive function 
impairments in the MetS may reflect alterations in cognitive control brain regions (Hoth et al., 
2011; Yates et al., 2012) that support a broad range of hierarchical cognitive processes 
implicated in reappraisal (Niendam et al., 2012). In sum, the cognitive control processes through 
which affective and cognitive pathways converge to influence the relations between reappraisal 
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and MetS risk may provide some insight into the possible prefrontal and cingulate brain regions 
that support emotion regulation (Ochsner et al., 2012). 
Consistent with this view of reappraisal engaging various forms of cognitive control that 
are typically unrelated to emotion, our finding that positive functional connectivity of the dACC 
and right DLPFC was correlated with increased cognitive reappraisal use suggests that 
individuals who make repeated use of reappraisal might engage a neural circuitry implicated in 
processing conflict that is largely cognitive (Mohanty et al., 2007). Based on the functional 
distinction between ACC subregions, the increased recruitment of this dACC response within 
this cortico-cortical network by high reappraisers may reflect the initial use of cognitive, rather 
than emotional, cues from the environment to guide subsequent behavior, which accords with the 
notion that incongruent color-word stimuli represents two conflicting sources of information 
contained within the color word and the ink color that are identified by the dACC (Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004). Although there is evidence (Kerns et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) that 
dACC can take on a dual-role in both monitoring for response conflict and adjusting subsequent 
behavior, conflict models indicate that the dACC signals DLPFC regions when additional 
cognitive control abilities are required to adjust behavior through goal-driven attentional process. 
In the context of emotion regulation, the link between cognitive reappraisal and positive dACC-
DLPFC connectivity is consistent with neural models of emotion regulation that highlight 
cortico-cortical connections between dACC and lateral PFC regions support various cognitive 
control processes (i.e., selective attention, performance monitoring, and planning) involved in 
automatic regulation of emotion (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2008). Moreover, since 
cognitive reappraisal involves integrating various cognitive control processes in order to focus 
attention on and monitor motivationally relevant stimuli, it is plausible that the neural pattern of 
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activity among individuals who typically use reappraisal would show functional relationships 
between brain regions that are implicated in specific cognitive control processes. Interestingly, 
the functional role of this dACC-DLPFC connectivity was highlighted in another study that 
found individual differences in the ability to cognitively process one’s emotional state was 
positively associated with increased functional connectivity between dACC and right DLPFC 
during an emotion decision-making task. Together with our results, this dACC-DLPFC cognitive 
control network might be broadly involved in implementing executive control processes that 
guide attention to either salient cognitive or emotional cues that require effortful decision-
making. In this regard, it is notable here that we failed to replicate prior studies (Drabant et al., 
2009; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013) that found a relationship between cognitive reappraisal and 
neural activity within individual ROIs across prefrontal and cingulate regions. These initial 
studies reported that individual differences in reappraisal use correlates with increased activity 
within similar prefrontal cortical regions that are engaged by the Stroop incongruent condition, 
including DLPFC, dACC, and lateral OFC (Drabant et al., 2009; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). 
Hence, this raises questions as to why we failed to find an association between the tendency to 
use reappraisal and activation in any isolated PFC region. 
There are several reasons to explain the null finding between prefrontal and cingulate 
ROIs and reappraisal in our sample. First, the two earlier studies utilized fMRI paradigms that 
involved perceptual processing of emotional material. Drabant et al. (2009) employed a task that 
had participants process emotionally negative facial expressions. Similarly, Vanderhasselt et al. 
(2013) used a task that required participants to inhibit a dominant response to negative emotional 
information in favor of an opposite emotion. The negative emotionally of these two tasks 
indicates that, to some extent, several cognitive emotion regulatory processes were being taxed, 
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especially in the Vanderhasselt et al. (2012) study, where individuals had to utilize cognitive 
control abilities in order to inhibit the prepotent emotional response. Since participants had to 
focus on emotional cues in order to perform these task, it is likely that prefrontal and cingulate 
activity within these two studies reflect a greater degree of cognitive control of negative emotion 
than an effortful cognitive task, such as the Stroop. Additional support for this need to control 
negative emotions within these studies is reflected in the robust amygdala response that both 
tasks elicited. The absence of an amygdala response during the incongruent Stroop condition 
suggests that reappraisers may not have been engaging in any explicit emotion regulation aimed 
at down-regulating negative affect. In contrast, Drabant et al. (2009) found reappraisal use was 
inversely related to amygdala activity during threat-related processing while Vanderhasselt et al. 
(2013) showed that amygdala activity increased while disengaging from negative faces among 
individuals who use expressive suppression regulatory strategies. Hence, from these two studies, 
it is possible that observed activation in prefrontal cortical regions is more proximally related to 
emotion-related reappraisal functions, given the need to process and inhibit negative emotional 
information in their fMRI paradigms. In contrast, the activity in our prefrontal and cingulate 
regions most likely reflects “cold” cognitive control activations that may not be as proximal to 
the explicit function of cognitive reappraisal strategies, which is to reframe an affectively 
charged situation into unemotional terms (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
 The observation that habitual reappraisal use relates to the MetS may have significance 
for interventions targeted at resolving adverse health behaviors that contribute to the MetS and 
possibly CHD risk (Vitaliano et al., 2002). Specifically, studies of health behaviors have begun 
to highlight how individual differences in the capacity to regulate emotion can alter the 
psychological distress and negative emotional processes that often relate to poor health 
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behaviors, such as tobacco use and high carbohydrate intake unmet by commensurate 
expenditures of energy. Interestingly, our findings agree with the association between emotion 
regulation and health behaviors given that we found a neural circuitry within dACC and DLPFC 
brain regions involved in cognitive control of behavior statistically mediated the link between 
reappraisal and the MetS. This dACC-DLPFC control network is consistently implicated in 
monitoring and implementing adjustments in behavior in the face of conflict processing. Thus, 
this dACC-DLPFC circuit may represent a neurobiological pathway through which individuals 
who typically use reappraisal may engage in adaptive health behaviors that are inversely 
associated with risk for the MetS. For example, among depressed adult smokers, less frequent 
use of reappraisal was associated longer smoking duration and more cigarette puffs (Fucito, 
Juliano, & Toll, 2010). Similarly, a recent study found that relative to cognitive reappraisal, 
suppression of emotion covaries with poor eating behaviors, namely increased intake of 
‘comfort’ foods (Evers, Marijn Stok, & De Ridder, 2010). Further, adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, such as reappraisal, have been shown to decrease the desirability of craved food 
(Giuliani, Calcott, Berkamn, 2013) as well as the consumption of food following a negative 
emotional experience (Taut, Renner, & Baban, 2012). Consistent with these behavioral studies, 
several neuroimaging studies have shown that measures of activity within nodes of this dACC-
DLPFC circuit are linked to decreased craving for food and cigarettes as a result of cognitive 
reappraisal (Kober et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2012). Taken together, it appears that prefrontal and 
cingulate activity associated with use of reappraisal strategies covaries with adaptive health 
behaviors that reduce risk for the MetS. This suggests that a behavioral pathway may underlie 
the inverse relation between dACC-DLPFC connectivity and the MetS. 
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 At this stage, it is important to highlight several limitations of this study. We tested a 
putative meditation model that functional variation in cognitive control brain systems would 
partly account for the association between cognitive reappraisal and the MetS. However, our 
cross-sectional design does not support causal inferences within this model, nor does it permit 
the exclusion of other neurobiological explanations of our study outcomes. Experimental and 
longitudinal designs will help tease apart the directionality of these associations and mediation 
effects reported here in addition to providing a more comprehensive assessment of potential 
confounders or effect modifiers. The possibility of various ‘third-factor’ explanations will also 
be important to address in the context of multimodal neuroimaging studies that incorporate 
positron emission tomography (PET) imaging. For instance, future work could explore the 
variability in central serotonergic and dopaminergic modulatory systems, with existing reviews 
highlighting within various animal species, including humans, that these monoamine systems are 
linked to individual differences in regulatory coping styles (Koolhaas, De Boer, Coppens, & 
Buwalda, 2010). In relation, the MetS has been associated with central alterations in these two 
monoamine systems (Muldoon et al., 2004, 2006; Rubi & Maechler, 2010; Williams et al., 
2010), which furthers the notion that other neural pathways could account for the association 
between different forms of emotion regulation and the MetS. Another limitation was examining 
typical reappraisal use in association with just one fMRI task—namely, processing of conflictual 
color-word information. The use of the Stroop color-word task was based on its ability to 
robustly activate cognitive control brain circuitry and evoke subjective psychological distress 
(Sheu et al., 2012). Hence, the Stroop task would appear to be appropriate for probing whether 
functional variation in cognitive control system activity covaries with indicators of the MetS, and 
by extension possibly links habitual reappraisal use to such indicators given its increasing use in 
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cognitive neuroimaging as an assay of cognitive control and interference resolution (Nee et al., 
2007). However, despite the subjective frustration and negative affect that the Stroop task elicits, 
the current fMRI findings that cognitive reappraisal covaries with increased dACC-DLPFC 
connectivity patterns cannot be interpreted from an emotion regulation standpoint. In light of 
this, additional work is needed to determine whether individual differences in typical reappraisal 
use engages neural response during an emotion regulation paradigm wherein reappraisal of 
negative stimuli is instructed and voluntary. Prior research has shown that reappraisers exhibit 
increased recruitment of control-related prefrontal regions that appears to down-regulate activity 
in emotion-generative limbic regions (Drabant et al., 2009). Moving forward, future studies 
might benefit from examining typical reappraisal use in the context of an explicit emotion 
regulation task so as to determine whether cortico-cortical connectivity patterns exist during the 
processing and integration of cognitive and emotional stimuli. Specifically, it is possible that 
some degree of implicit, automatic emotion regulation may have occurred while individuals 
performed the Stroop task given that reappraisal was linked to increased valence following the 
cognitive stressor task. Hence, additional work will help distinguish whether this dACC-DLPFC 
connectivity pattern reflects reappraisal-related activation or more broad cognitive control 
processes (Niendam et al., 2012). Lastly, although these findings prove novel, we are left to 
speculate on how increased dACC-DLPFC connectivity associates with cardiometabolic 
outcomes. There is considerable evidence from the health behavior literature that individual 
differences in dACC and DLPFC functioning is linked to smoking and excess eating. However, 
this study lacks the relevant measures of physiology to able to characterize whether autonomic 
and neuroendocrine pathways link cortical brain function to MetS. 
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These limitations notwithstanding, the present set of results support the notion that 
cognitive reappraisal strategies may relate to MetS risk. Further, individuals who use reappraisal 
in everyday life appear to strongly engage a cognitive control neural network during a 
demanding executive function task that is associated with implementing conflict-monitoring 
functions and behavioral adjustments in action plans (Kerns et al., 2004). Since the Stroop task 
did not explicitly call for reappraisal, it is also possible that individuals who habitually use 
cognitive reappraisal may recruit automatic forms of cognitive control represented in prefrontal 
and cingulate brain regions that exert regulatory self-control processes that are not always 
targeted towards emotion regulation per se (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Although the present fMRI 
results to do not extend to explicit forms of emotion regulation, the findings highlight a distinct 
non-affective cognitive control pathway that reappraisers may recruit in order to exert control 
over maladaptive health behaviors and perhaps aspects of peripheral physiology related to the 
MetS. 
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